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Maleska: Stinging the Stingray: The Need for Strong State-Level Anti-Surve

STINGING THE STINGRAY: THE NEED FOR
STRONG STATE-LEVEL ANTI-SURVEILLANCE
LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Daniel Rigmaiden, known to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
as “the Hacker,” is the man who revealed the Stingray to the public. 1 For
Rigmaiden, it all started in the Los Padres National Forest in California. 2
There, Rigmaiden, who had virtually no connections to the outside world,
devised a tax-fraud scheme.3 Using only his laptop and AirCard, a device
that is used to get Internet service for a laptop via cellphone tower,
Rigmaiden successfully filed hundreds of fraudulent tax returns from
deceased Californians.4
Rigmaiden’s only problem was accessing the money: he needed to
obtain it without being traced.5 To do this, he set up debit card accounts
using fake identities. 6 He resided in a hotel room in the city to make it
See Cale Guthrie Weismann, How An Obsessive Recluse Blew The Lid Off the Secret
Technology Authorities Use to Spy On Peoples’ Cellphones, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 19, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-daniel-rigmaiden-discovered-stingray-spyingtechnology-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/6SZF-FGN8] (detailing Daniel Rigmaiden’s story
about how he was able to uncover a device that was before completely hidden from the
public); American Greed: Hack Me if You Can [hereinafter Hack Me if You Can] (NBC television
broadcast Aug. 25, 2016) (providing the FBI’s account of the investigation that eventually led
to the arrest of Daniel Rigmaiden, who at the time was so well-hidden that the police referred
to him only as “the Hacker.”).
2
See Note to Self: When Your Conspiracy Theory is True, WNYC PUBLIC RADIO (June 19,
2015) (recording available at http://www.wnyc.org/story/stingray-conspiracy-theorydaniel-rigmaiden-radiolab/) [hereinafter When Your Conspiracy Theory is True] (explaining
how Rigmaiden’s anti-government tendencies and computer savvy led him to setting up the
scheme).
3
See Rebecca McCray, From Con Artist to Government Combatant: A Recluse Comes Out of
Hiding, TAKEPART (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/02/04/danielrigmaiden-stingray-truth-and-power
[https://perma.cc/9BCT-AUKP]
(addressing
Rigmaiden’s reclusive behavior, his tax-fraud scheme, and how he used these to his
advantage).
4
See When Your Conspiracy Theory is True, supra note 2 (stating that the tax-fraud scheme
to take from hundreds of Californians was working very well at the outset). See also Hack Me
if You Can, supra note 1 (explaining that, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI the system
that Daniel Rigmaiden had set up was nearly untraceable); Melanie Pinola, What Is an
Aircard? Mobile Office Technology, LIFEWIRE (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/whatis-an-aircard-2377410 [https://perma.cc/2AZK-HEQ6] (describing the functionality of an
AirCard, which is generally a small card that plugs into a USB and connects a remote laptop
to nearby cell towers to connect the laptop to the internet).
5
See Hack Me if You Can, supra note 1 (pointing out that the best way to accomplish the
feat of withdrawing money without being traced is to use debit cards).
6
See Weismann, supra note 1 (describing that Rigmaiden was able to accomplish this with
relative ease because of the fact he created numerous fake ID’s and was completely out of
the public eye). See also Hack Me if You Can, supra note 1 (explaining the meticulous care that
1
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easier to withdraw money from ATMs, but to maintain his anonymity he
needed to spread out his withdrawals and set up accounts at several
different banks.7 Eventually, he realized that with the help of accomplices,
he could withdraw enough money to leave the country and start a new
life.8 Thus, he turned to anonymous internet message boards to recruit
people willing to withdraw the money from the IRS to put onto debit
cards.9
Rigmaiden, using only his laptop computer and Aircard, knew that
with current technology he was untraceable, so he had a false-sense of
security.10 Soon, however, the FBI was able to track down one of his
accomplices, and the police narrowed his general location to Palo Alto,
California.11 At that time, the police officers conducted a sweep search
using a Stingray—which was completely shielded from the public at the
time—and found Rigmaiden using the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI) number that matched Rigmaiden’s AirCard.12
In a radio interview, Rigmaiden described the moment of his arrest,
“when I was laying on the sidewalk getting handcuffs put on me, I
instantly knew that they had tracked the AirCard down, . . . it was the
only weak link in the operation.” 13 While in prison, Rigmaiden spent his
days tirelessly trying to uncover the device that pinpointed his location by
going through thousands of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Rigmaiden took to not get caught throughout the scheme, even going so far as to sign his
signature on bank papers by palming the pen in such a way as to not give up finger prints).
7
See Hack Me if You Can, supra note 1 (illustrating that Rigmaiden was living a secluded
lifestyle while in his hotel room, and most of his day was spent walking to random ATMs to
take out modest withdrawals so as not to trigger suspicion).
8
See When Your Conspiracy Theory is True, supra note 2 (stating his own account of the
plan, Rigmaiden believed that this was going to give him enough money to get out while he
was ahead).
9
See Hack Me if You Can, supra note 1 (reminiscing the investigation, the FBI agents
working the case believed that the main flaw in Rigmaiden’s scheme was when he reached
out for accomplices).
10
See id. (detailing how investigators were able to find one of Rigmaiden’s accomplices
with a tip from a post office worker in Arizona who discovered suspicious mailings going to
a particular address, all being identical but addressed to different names).
11
See When Your Conspiracy Theory is True, supra note 2 (explaining that once the police
had Rigmaiden’s general area the investigation was far from over because they had no way
of tracing Rigmaiden using traditional investigatory techniques).
12
See id. (describing the government’s use of the secretive Stingray-device to find
Rigmaiden, which would not have been possible otherwise). See also infra Part II.A.2
(explaining the basics of Stingray technology); sources cited infra note 45 (explaining that an
International Mobile Subscriber number, IMSI number, is an individualized number given
to each cellphone or AirCard that identifies the device).
13
See id. (recalling the thoughts going through Rigmaiden’s mind at the time of arrest).
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documents until discovering enough evidence to blow the lid off the
Stingray, which turned out to be a tightly-held government secret. 14
This Note recommends that states should continue enacting or
amending statutes that control the use of the Stingray by both police
officers and private citizens by proposing a three-fold approach that state
legislators should consider.15 Part II explains the technology of the
Stingray, the history of the device, and various legal standards that apply
to police searches under the Fourth Amendment. 16 Next, Part III argues
that the third-party doctrine is inapplicable to the Stingray, analyzes state
and federal law, and concludes that the current federal standards do not
fit well with the various capabilities of the Stingray.17 Finally, Part IV
proposes that states should consider a threefold approach when enacting
or amending Stingray legislation.18
II. BACKGROUND
First, Part II.A explains what the Stingray is and how it functions. 19
Then, Part II.B discusses how the federal government went to extreme
measures to keep the Stingray from public disclosure. 20 Next, Part II.C
discusses applicable Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the use of
the Stingray.21 Finally, Part II.D explores potential sources of federal law
and developing state statutes that apply to the Stingray.22
A. Dissecting the Stingray
This section provides background information about what the
Stingray is and how it functions, which is essential to understanding what
14
See McCray, supra note 3 (noting that the government handed over 14,000 pages of
evidence that they used to prosecute Rigmaiden).
15
See infra Part IV (offering the author’s proposed legislative approach).
16
See infra Part II (providing background information relating to the Stingray and
potential legal standards that may apply to police use of the device).
17
See infra Part III.B (analyzing various federal standards including the Pen Register
statute and the Wiretap Act).
18
See infra Part IV (arguing that the best approach legislatures can take involves a
combination of strict warrant requirements, deterrence, and judicial oversight).
19
See infra Section II.A (exploring the basic functions of cellphone technology and then
describing how the Stingray can manipulate the technology to access communications,
location, and device information of the cellphone).
20
See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the coordinated secrecy between the FBI and state
governments to keep the Stingray away from the public eye by requiring non-disclosure
agreements).
21
See infra Section II.C (explaining pertinent Supreme Court cases that have analyzed the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
22
See infra Section II.D (addressing several sources of federal law regarding
communication interception and more recent initiatives to limit the use of the Stingray).
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standards should be enacted for use of the Stingray.23 First, Part II.A.1
gives background information on how cellphones connect to cell towers
and how the technology has evolved over the years. 24 Then, Part II.A.2
explains how the Stingray manipulates cellphone technology. 25
1.

The Basics of Cellphone Technology

Before understanding the Stingray, it is useful to understand that
cellular telephones (“cellphones”) send and receive radio waves, which
are inherently interceptable.26 The cellphone is merely a sophisticated
version of a two-way radio.27 Cellphones emit a low-powered radio
frequency that sends and receives information by connecting to a nearby
cellphone tower.28 Similar to a radio, close proximity to the cell tower will
generally lead to better reception unless the signal is obstructed.29
Cellphones connect to the approximately 215,000 cell towers in the United
States.30 These cell towers are all subject to licensing requirements by the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC). 31
See infra Part II (giving necessary information into the inner-workings of the Stingray).
See infra Part II.A (explaining how basic cellphone technology works similar to a radio,
and that all cellphones within range will automatically connect to towers around them).
25
See infra Part II.B (discussing the way in which the Stingray is able to act as a fake tower
and manipulate the auto-connectivity of cellphones to cell towers).
26
See infra Part II.A.1 (providing background information on how cellular technology
works).
27
See Rong Wang, How Do Cell Phones Work?, PONG BLOG (Dec. 20, 2014),
http://www.pongcase.com/blog/cell-phones-work/
[https://perma.cc/QAB4-96AT]
(comparing current cellphone technology with that of a two-way radio and explaining how
the technology developed to its current form).
28
See id. (discussing how cellphones use a transmitter and a receiver to connect with cell
towers). See also Michael Miller, How Mobile Networks Work, QUE (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.quepublishing.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2021961 [http://perma.cc/TA43AXLV] (explaining the use of very low powered radio frequency transmissions to contact
nearby cell towers, or “base stations”). These base stations are geographically located in
hexagonal areas with minor overlap to ensure the best cell reception to all cellphones within
range. Id.
29
See Wang, supra note 27 (noting that certain “impediments” can weaken signal
strength). See also Ken Perkins, The Top 5 Surprising Things You Didn’t Know Could Block Your
Cell Signal, WEBOOST BLOG (Apr. 6, 2016), https://blog.weboost.com/news/blog/the-top-5surprising-things-you-didnt-know-could-block-your-cell-signal/ [https://perma.cc/H25Q8Z5F] (stating that some common cellphone weakening factors can include far proximity
from the cell tower, the type of terrain, buildings, bridges, cars, foliage, and varying
conditions in the atmosphere).
30
See Cell Phone Tower Statistics, (June 12, 2016), http://www.statisticbrain.com/cellphone-tower-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/324K-6ZBR] (providing that 215,000 cell towers
are located in the United States, each of which has a maximum range of 21.7 miles).
31
See Tower and Antenna Setting, (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.fcc.gov/general/towerand-antenna-siting [https://perma.cc/B2CU-GH7T] (explaining the FCC requirements for
cell phone towers). See also Jason Norman, Taking the Sting out of the Stingray: The Dangers of
23
24
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Cellphone technology is categorized by four generations.32 The same
basic radio technology is used for each generation, but cell data has
evolved mostly from the technological development of frequency waves. 33
During the First Generation of cellphone technology (“1G”), cellphones
sent out only analogue data that gave the user the ability to make phone
calls.34 As the technology developed, service providers turned to moresophisticated data transmissions using digital transmissions as opposed
to analogue transmissions.35 The digital-to-analog development is what
signified the Second Generation (“2G”), which gave rise to the ability to
send text messages and slow, but usable, web browsing capabilities. 36 The
Third Generation (“3G”) focused on faster Internet usage for smartphones
that drastically increased the speed of digital communication. 37 Currently,
cellphone technology is still in the Fourth Generation (“4G”). 38 The 4G

Cell-Site Simulator Use and the Role of the Federal Communications Commission in Protecting
Privacy & Security, 68 FED. COMM. L.J. 139, 176–77 (2016) (positing that FCC could hold police
agencies subject to encryption regulations by creating an administrative rule under Title II
of the Federal Communications Act, which allows the FCC to regulate encryption).
32
See Dan Cudjoe, Review of Generations and Physics of Cellphone Technology, 4 INT’L J. OF
INFO. SCI. 1, 2 (discussing the history and four generations of cellular technology, including
the outlook for the fifth generation of cellular technology).
33
See id. (noting the existence of radio technology even after the technological jumps from
each generation). See also Miller, supra note 28 (detailing that the evolution of frequency band
technology was key to increasing the speed and capabilities of cellular networks).
34
See Miller, supra note 28 (providing that the first generation of cellular technology relied
on analogue data).
35
See Miller, supra note 28 (distinguishing between the first and second generation based
on the development of digital transmissions and stating that Second Generation internet
usage is “painfully slow”). Compare Digital Technology, Dictionary of American History (2003)
(“Digitized information is recorded in binary code of combinations of the digits 0 and 1, also
called bits, which represent words and images.”) with analogue, vocabulary.com (2016)
(“Analog is the opposite of digital . . . [a]ny technology, such as vinyl records or clocks with
hands and faces, that doesn't break everything down into binary code to work is analog”).
36
See Miller, supra note 28 (explaining that the advent of digitized information in cell
technology also brought the capability to transfer text messages or even access the internet,
although usable internet was more of a focus for the Third Generation of cellular technology).
37
See Miller, supra note 28 (emphasizing that the Third Generation is geared towards
enabling smartphone capabilities). See also Chris Woodford, Mobile Broadband (June 9, 2016),
http://www.explainthatstuff.com/mobilebroadband.html
[https://perma.cc/FP2W2WX3] (explaining that the reason for much higher speeds was due to the fact that multiple
phones could be using the same radio frequency simultaneously, which allows for data
transfer similar to the way the internet works).
38
See Cudjoe, supra note 32 (noting that cellphone technology currently still in the Fourth
Generation, but that the Fifth Generation of wireless cellular technology is expected to arrive
by 2020).
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network is considerably faster because it connects users to a high-speed
mobile broadband network.39
2.

A Brief Overview of the Capabilities of Stingray Technology

“Stingray” is the brand name of one of the more popular devices in
the family of IMSI catchers, but for this Note all mentions of the various
types of IMSI catchers will be referred to as “Stingray.” 40 The Stingray
was produced by the Harris Company, which has gone through great
lengths to keep the technology from being publicly disclosed. 41 As
discussed previously, cellphones work by automatically connecting to the
closest cell tower.42 The Stingray manipulates a cellphone’s automaticconnectivity by serving as a fake tower. 43 With this capability, it gathers
not only the information from the target cellphone, but all cellphones
within its range and then targets a particular device to glean even more
user information from the target.44

39
See Woodford, supra note 37 (suggesting that the Fourth Generation of cellular
technology further allows for multiple users on the same frequency by using Orthogonal
Frequency-Division Multiple Access technology).
40
See Notice of Acceptance of § 8 Declaration and § 9, Renewal (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn76303503&docId=SPE20130404144554#
docIndex=0&page=1 [https://perma.cc/998M-VWAH] (accepting the Harris Corporation’s
Trademark for the Stingray). See also Government Cellphone Surveillance Catalogue, (Dec. 17,
2015),
https://theintercept.com/document/2015/12/16/government-cellphonesurveillance-catalogue/ [https://perma.cc/2DB9-HMD5] (exposing the various types of
IMSI-catchers, including new devices that are specially designed to circumvent 4G security
features).
41
See Sam Biddle, Long-Secret Stingray Manuals Detail How Police Can Spy on Phones,
INTERCEPT (Sept. 12, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/12/long-secret-stingraymanuals-detail-how-police-can-spy-on-phones/ [https://perma.cc/5B3L-A2NX] (detailing
the efforts that Harris has made in maintaining secrecy of their owners’ manuals by claiming
that it could hurt their competitive interests and allow for criminals to have access to the
information).
42
See Miller, supra note 28 (describing how cellphones automatically connect to cell towers
by using a low-powered transmitter).
43
See Stingray Tracking Devices, ACLU (2015), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/stingray-tracking-devices [https://perma.cc/D4KTT6DT] (defining the key capabilities of Stingrays by stating that “Stingrays . . . are invasive
cell phone surveillance devices that mimic cell phone towers and send out signals to trick
cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information.”).
44
See Kate Klonick, Stingrays: Not Just for Feds!, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catche
rs_how_local_law_enforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/
5R3C-XAXY] (providing that all cellphones within range of the tower will automatically
connect to the Stingray).
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First, Stingrays are able to gather certain device information.45 For
instance, one key piece of user information that the Stingray gathers is the
IMSI number.46 The IMSI can identify the mobile subscriber because it is
a user-specific identification number.47 The Stingray can also gather other
information about the device, including the device’s serial number, and
Mobile Identity Number (MIN), if the target sends or receives a text
message.48 Beyond just device information, police officers can view whom
the user is currently contacting.49 These communications can include
either voice calls or text messages.50 Not only can the Stingray user view
the cellphone information, but officers can also log this information on an
accompanying software program. 51 These software programs can show
the devices that have communicated with each other within the Stingray’s
radius.52

45
See infra notes 59–66 and accompanying text (explaining the types of device information
that is taken when a cellular device is targeted by the Stingray).
46
See Gemini Quick Start Guide (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/3105793-Gemini-3-3-Quick-Start-Guide.html [https://perma.cc/F2DZ-HXF5]
at 13 (instructing users about how to collect the IMSI from all cellular devices within range).
47
See International Mobile Subscriber Identity, TECHOPEDIA (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5067/international-mobile-subscriber-identityimsi [https://perma.cc/TK7F-TJ6N] (defining the IMSI number as “a unique number,
usually fifteen digits, associated with Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) network mobile phone
users . . . [t]he IMSI is a unique number identifying a GSM subscriber.”).
48
See Gemini Quick Start Guide, supra note 46, at 13 (providing that the serial number is
one of the pieces of identifying information that can be gathered from a subscriber who
connects to the Stingray). See also Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police Stingray Spy Tools Can Indeed
Record Calls, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/stingraygovernment-spy-tools-can-record-calls-new-documents-confirm/ (relying on documents
from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that give guidelines for police officers and
provide that the target’s phone number can be gathered after the target has connected to the
Stingray if the target sends or receives a phone call or text message).
49
See Gemini Quick Start Guide, supra note 46, at 26 (describing how the logging process
can be completed by the Stingray user). See also United States v. Tutis, Crim. No. 14-699, 2016
WL 6136577 at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016) (referring to a government wiretap request that
specifically stated that the IMSI catcher was only going to be used to determine the location
of the data, and “not to obtain any written or oral communications,” indicating that the IMSI
catcher has the ability to determine location).
50
See Klonick, supra note 44 (stating that all devices connected to the Stingray furnish their
outgoing calls and texts).
51
See generally Gemini Quick Start Guide, supra note 46 (enabling users to easily use the
technology on PC-based computer platforms).
52
See Gemini Quick Start Guide, supra note 46 (explaining how the Stingray shows devices
who have communicated with each other by viewing the incoming and outgoing messages
and matching it to the other cell numbers within the vicinity).
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Second, Stingrays have the ability to actively intercept or block voice
and text communications.53 They send a signal to the selected cellphone
asking it to respond with communication data. 54 Acting as a celltower, the
Stingray can copy the unencrypted digital data and the user, presumably
a police officer, can view the Short Message Service (SMS) message, or
listen to the phone call in real-time.55 The Stingray can also accomplish
phone and text interception by knocking the cell connection from 3G, 4G
or Long-Term Evolution (LTE) down to the less-secure 2G.56
Finally, the Stingray has the ability to triangulate cellphone users’
coordinates similar to a Global Positioning System (GPS), or the “Find my
Friends” app.57 In fact, the Stingray user manual shows that the software
allows for a Google Earth plug-in.58 Police can view all the cellphone users
within its radius, and target any user’s location based on their device’s
information.59
53
See Zetter, supra note 48 (citing documents released by California law enforcement that
show police officers have the ability to listen to voice calls and view texts with the Stingray
and gives the legal guidelines police officers should follow while using the device). See also
Robert Kolker, What Happens When the Surveillance State Becomes an Affordable Gadget,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/whathappens-when-the-surveillance-state-becomes-an-affordable-gadget
[http://perma.cc/
MBZ6-W64Q] (describing the procedure that Stingray devices or more-advanced IMSI
catchers can use to infiltrate text messages and calls of 3G and 4G networks).
54
See Jason Hernandez, How IMSI Catchers Work, NORTH STAR POST (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.nstarpost.com/news/how-imsi-catchers-work/ [https://perma.cc/5KXD,HY57] (diagramming the process that the Stingray uses as acting as a fake cell tower, and
showing that cell towers have a fair amount of discretion in instructing cellphones how to
operate).
55
See id. (explaining how the Stingray deploys the “man-in-the-middle” attack and can
furnish information from the unsuspecting cellphone user).
56
See Biddle, supra note 51 (detailing the procedure that police officers can use to
accomplish the “knocking” procedure using a Stingray). See also Kolker, supra note 53
(explaining that although it was originally assumed that Stingrays were incapable of
intercepting calls and texts, it has been proven that the knocking process has already been
deployed by the Hailstorm, which is a type of IMSI catcher).
57
See Hernandez, supra note 54 (describing that once connected to the cellphone, the
Stingray—acting as a fake cell tower—can instruct the cellphone to reconnect too frequently
and thus turn the cellphone into a “beacon” of the users location). See also About Find my
Friends, APPLE (2016), https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT201493 [https://perma.cc/
manage/create] (explaining the iPhone application that allows users to permit location
access to other users).
58
See iDen Transceiver Operations Manual 93 (2013) https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/3105641-iDEN-2-4-Operator-Manual.html
[https://perma.cc/2CDL-FR7F]
[hereinafter Operations Manual] (giving the Stingray operator the directions on how to
download a Google-earth plug-in to use with the software).
59
See id. (detailing how the map plugin can monitor multiple cellphone subscribers within
the device’s radius). To accomplish this, the user manual states:
Map Router is capable of calculating Location Finding estimates for
multiple subscribers. Current Location Finding estimates for each
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B. From Warzones to Squad Cars: The Pandemic Rise of the Stingray in
Policing Agencies
On August 21, 2001, the Harris Corporation filed a United States
trademark registration form for the name “Stingray.” 60 At the outset,
Stingrays were developed for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a
spying tool to circumvent international cellphone companies that would
not give the CIA access to their phone records.61 But soon, the Harris
Corporation had created a market for the Stingray outside of the federal
intelligence community, and other administrative agencies bought the
device.62 Like any other market, the devices and software developed, so
that intelligence agencies would buy newer models and sell the older
models to lower-level agencies.63
Presently, it is generally understood that police use the Stingray in
four types of scenarios: (1) identifying cellular devices in use by an
identified suspect; (2) more precisely locating devices when a phone
carrier is incapable; (3) electively blocking devices or dialed numbers; and

enabled subscriber are sent to all enabled map outputs. Results for all
subscribers are retained until the results are manually changed or the
input to Map Router is changed.
Id.
See
Stingray
Trademark
Information,
TRADEMARKIA
(Oct.
27,
2016),
http://www.trademarkia.com/stingray-76303503.html
[https://perma.cc/5XP5-K2CX]
(providing the dates of the Stingray’s copyright, as well as additional information about the
copyrighted material).
61
See Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 25, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-isthe-big-secret-surrounding-stingray-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/9TA4-FLQT]
(explaining the history of how Stingrays came into existence).
62
See id. (discussing the “trickle-down” effect, whereby the device started in the hands of
military and intelligence agencies and eventually landed in the hands of local police officers).
See also Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/
stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them?redirect=maps/stingray-tracking-devices-whosgot-them [https://perma.cc/E84E-RY5D] [hereinafter Who’s Got Them?] (providing that the
federal agencies known to use the Stingray, including: the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the United States Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the United States Marshal Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Explosives, the
Internal Revenue Service, the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States
Marine Corps, the United States National Guard, the United States Special Operations
Command, and the National Security Agency).
63
See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore:
The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National
Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 76 (2014–2015) (discussing the how
the market for the Stingray expanded from the FBI, to state and local governments, and now
is so widespread that citizens have access to the device). See also Who’s Got Them?, supra note
62 (noting that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia are now known to be using
the technology with either the state or local police forces).
60
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(4) military and foreign intelligence. 64 Although these scenarios suggest
that the police uses are potentially limited, it has been reported that some
police agencies use the Stingray routinely during drug, burglary, and
murder investigations.65
In an effort to shield the inner-workings of the Stingray from the
public—especially from terrorists or criminals who could potentially
harm the public—the FBI required state and local police agencies to sign
non-disclosure agreements as a condition to buying the device.66 Indeed,
the FBI-mandated non-disclosure technique successfully kept the device
completely shielded from the public eye, until two notable cases helped
uncover the truth.67
In 2012, Daniel Rigmaiden appealed his case on several grounds in the
Rigmaiden challenged the
pre-trial stages of his prosecution. 68
constitutionality of the search as violating his legitimate expectation of
privacy and by obtaining historical records from his AirCard. 69
64
See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 63, at 17–18 (explaining that first situation is
implemented by using sweep searches that look through phones in local areas where the
suspect is likely to be located). The second situation occurs in situations where a cellphone
provider is unable to “ping” the location data of the cellphone. Id. The third situation allows
police to target a device or group of devices and cut off all wireless capabilities to the affected
cellular devices. Id. The final situation occurs in war zones, and was the original use of the
Stingray’s capabilities. Id. See also In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747,
747 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (exemplifying the second situation, whereby law enforcement used a
Pen Register application seeking to track the suspect using a police vehicle and Stingray in
order to determine the suspects telephone number).
65
See John Campbell, LAPD Spied on 21 Using StingRay Anti-Terrorism Tool, LA WEEKLY
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.laweekly.com/news/lapd-spied-on-21-using-stingray-antiterrorism-tool-2612739 [https://perma.cc/F7PL-C3RQ] (exposing the widespread use of the
Stingray by the LAPD, using the device over twenty-one times in a four-month period for
seemingly routine investigations).
66
See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 63, at 38 (discussing at length how police enforcement
agencies used the non-disclosure agreements for years to use the Stingray and how they
masked the actual capabilities of the technology from judges).
67
See infra Section II.A–B (explaining revelations made during Daniel Rigmaiden’s pretrial legal proceedings, as well as a judge’s denial of a request of a Pen Register order to use
a Stingray).
68
See United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 988–99 (D. Ariz. 2012) (providing
the many appeals that Rigmaiden lodged regarding civil rights violations made by the
government in attaining his personal information and tracking him down). These appeals
included challenges to warrants based on probable cause, particularity, and exceeding the
scope of the warrants. Id.
69
See United States v. Rigmaiden, CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14 (D. Ariz.
May 8, 2013) (explaining that in issuing his decision the Judge presiding over Rigmaiden’s
trial made a finding of probable cause). The judge found that “the use and monitoring of a
mobile tracking device” would “lead to evidence of” several specific crimes, including
conspiracy to defraud the government, fraud relating to identity information, aggravated
identity theft, and wire fraud, “as well as to the identification of individuals who are engaged
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Interestingly, the prosecution conceded that use of the Stingray, which
was not explicitly named in the case, constituted a Fourth Amendment
search.70 However, the judge still found that all of the numerous Fourth
Amendment challenges were satisfied.71
Luckily for Rigmaiden, the prosecution saw another side of him
during the nearly six-year-long legal battle after his arrest.72 In fact, the
prosecution urged the judge to circumvent federal sentencing
guidelines.73 Rigmaiden ultimately pled guilty to four felonies, and in
return he was given time-served, community service, and required to
return the stolen tax money.74
During the final stage of the Rigmaiden prosecution, a magistrate
opinion from Texas discussed the Stingray. 75 In this case, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) attempted to track a suspect believed to be
using a burner phone by filing for a pen register application, but the judge
denied the request on two grounds.76 First, the Stingray could gather

in the commission of these offenses.” Id. The judge also found that Rigmaiden did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in his AirCard, laptop, or apartment specifically because
they were “procured through fraud.” Id at *8.
70
See Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at *15 (stipulating to the fact that the search with the
Stingray qualified as a Fourth Amendment search and seizure of information); infra Part II.C
(discussing the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations of the Fourth Amendment).
71
See Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 995–96 (finding that “[f]or purposes of Defendant’s
Fourth Amendment arguments, that the search for the aircard was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). Notably, in one proceeding where Rigmaiden wanted
disclosure of additional discovery related to the Stingray that was concealed from the public
at the time the Judge stated that the government had reason to suppress the techniques it
used because “[the government’s] disclosure would therefore seriously hamper future law
enforcement efforts.” Id. at 988.
72
See Dennis Wagner, Tax Scammer Rigmaiden Pleads Guilty, Gets Time Served, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/07/
rigmaiden-tax-scammer-pleads-guilty/7448151/
[https://perma.cc/D9CD-GAF3]
(explaining to the Court that he believed the defendant had turned over a new leaf, the
prosecutor stated that, “I honestly believe the defendant has made a decision to enter society
and become a law-abiding member.”).
73
See id. (discussing the judge’s predisposition that he would dismiss the defendant’s
appeal, but that he respected the wishes of the prosecution).
74
See id. (detailing the plea deal that the prosecution reached with Rigmaiden after a sixtyeight month pre-trial battle).
75
See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (referring
to the word “stingray” in reference to an IMSI-catcher for the first time in any judicial
proceeding).
76
See id. at 748 (describing that the target was previously using a different telephone and
was believed to have switched to a new one that the DEA did not know). See also Brian L.
Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
183, 204 (2014) (explaining the planned police procedure to track the suspected narcotics
trafficker). Specifically, the police did not have the cellphone number of the defendant, so
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cellphone information from unintended targets, and the requesting agent
did not seem to know what would become of the information from the
unintended cellphone user information that might get swept up in the
Stingray search.77 The judge relied in part on the Rigmaiden proceedings,
whereby the government conceded that the use of a cell-site simulator was
a justifiable search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 78
Second, the judge denied the request because the Federal Pen Register
Statute requires that the government “have a telephone number or some
similar identifier before issuing an order.” 79 Therefore, because the
Federal Pen Register Statute requires information that the DEA was
unable to provide before conducting the search, the judge found that the
request was not adequate. 80 Because the Federal Pen Register Statute
requires a lower showing than a warrant, the court held that the pen
register was not sufficient for the diverse capabilities of the Stingray. 81

they planned to follow the suspect in a police vehicle while using the Stingray to determine
his cellphone number. Id.
77
See Owsley, supra note 76, at 204 (stating that the record on such devices was very
limited, and that in the only other comparable case, the government had procured a warrant
rather than a Pen Register order).
78
See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747 at 748 (describing the use of the
Pen and Trace order as not being adequate considering the government’s concession that a
cell site simulator required a warrant). See also supra note 70 and accompanying text
(analyzing the concession made by the government that the cell-site simulator indeed
required a warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment).
79
See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747 at 751 (referring to the pen
register application statutory language, which requires digital identifying information about
the target is who is sought). See also infra notes 153–71 and accompanying text (discussing
the exceedingly low requirements for issuance of a pen register order); Pen Register, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014):
An electronic device that tracks and records all the numbers dialed from
a particular telephone line, as well as all the routing, addressing, or
signaling information transmitted by other means of electronic
communications. [] Because a pen register does not record the contents
of any communication, it may not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search requiring a search warrant though it does need a court order.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
80
See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding
that the DEA lacked the specificity that is required for a pen register request). See also
Owsley, supra note 76, at 205 (explaining that the pen register statute required more
information than the suspect’s telephone number because “given the absence of a known cell
phone number target, neither case law nor statutory language supported the applicability of
the pen register statute to an application for a cell-site simulator”).
81
See infra Part II.C (analyzing the use of the pen register statute in light of the various
capabilities of the Stingray).
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C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment’s Protection from
Electronic Surveillance
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”82 To determine how
the Fourth Amendment applies to the government’s use of the Stingray, it
is useful to think of the Stingray’s capabilities separately, as follows: (1)
the ability to view incoming and outgoing telephone numbers; (2) the
ability to track the location of the device; and (3) the ability to intercept
communications.83 Due to government secrecy, courts have recently faced
evidentiary admissibility questions about the unwarranted use of the
Stingray.84 Because no statute directly addresses the admissibility of such
evidence in these states, the courts relied on the analogous Supreme Court
case law in ruling that Stingray-acquired evidence requires a warrant.85
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided its first landmark case regarding
police surveillance of a phone line.86 The Court held that every citizen has
a reasonable right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 87 However,

U.S. CONST. amend IV.
See supra Part II.A (describing how the Stingray can glean user information, intercept
texts and calls, and track cell phones). See also U.S. v. Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d 606, 606–11
(S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016) (exploring the Fourth Amendment considerations of the ability to
triangulate user identification); In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 747, 752
(determining that the pen register statute did not cover the government’s request to glean
device information that would pinpoint a suspected drug trafficker).
84
See Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 353 (Md. Spec. App. 2016) (holding that the
unwarranted use of a Stingray-like device violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation
of privacy); Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d at 616 (denying admission of evidence gathered from a
Stingray); United States v. Tutis, CR 14-699 (JBS), 2016 WL 6136577, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016)
(holding that a wiretap order satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement
whereby the government needs to show that the warrant has a particular description of
property that is to be seized).
85
See infra Part III.C (discussing states that have enacted statutes); Andrews, 134 A.3d at
336–37 (analyzing the Supreme Court decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment search);
Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d 606, at 606–11 (relying on several Supreme Court rulings in
determining that Stingray-acquired evidence requires a warrant).
86
See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(holding that the FBI was required to get a warrant before listening into and recording phone
calls of the defendant). After an FBI Agent overheard Charles Katz’s conversation regarding
a potential violation of federal gambling law, the agent placed a microphone outside of a
public phone booth that recorded Katz’s phone call. Id. at 131.
87
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (creating the precedential ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ standard). Specifically, the Court recognized that the officers were
required to get a warrant before placing the microphone, and the search could not be
82
83
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the Katz v. United States decision left the door open for future litigation by
stating “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”88 This
language would eventually become the basis for what is known as the
third-party doctrine.89
The third-party doctrine is a major exception to the reasonable
expectation of privacy and gives no Fourth Amendment protection to
information divulged to the public. 90 In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme
Court held that law enforcement officers were within their Constitutional
rights when viewing incoming and outgoing telephone calls stored in a
pen register.91 Such a device, the Court said, was not subject to an
expectation of privacy because the digits of the telephone number were
voluntarily given over to the telephone company when making the phone
call.92
Another exception is the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary
rule.93 This exception applies in situations where the government has
considered reasonable even if the police were able to establish probable cause after they had
already installed the microphone. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
88
Id. at 351. See also Steven M. Bellovin & Matt Blaze, It's Too Complicated: How the Internet
Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2016)
(explaining how the Katz decision only addressed the specific content of the phone call, not
the non-content information such as the numbers dialed).
89
See United States v. Thomas, 2015 WL 10634507, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing the
Constitutional basis of the “third-party doctrine”). See also Third-Party Doctrine, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The principle that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information that one has voluntarily disclosed to one or more third parties”).
90
See Simon Stern, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 364,
365 (2013) (detailing how the third-party doctrine defines the reasonableness of the privacy
expectation under the Fourth Amendment). The distinction can be made between public
and private information, and if the government gleans information that falls into the former
category, it is not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. This exception will even
apply if there has not been an affirmative consideration that the information is meant to be
public. Id.
91
See 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (holding that using information from a pen register was not
a Fourth Amendment search). The petitioner, who was found to have robbed a home, began
making threatening phone calls to the victim. Id. at 737. Police gathered the personal
information of the petitioner, and installed a pen register without a warrant to determine
whether he was making the phone calls to the victim. Id. After the prosecution used the
unwarranted pen register evidence, the petitioner argued that the installation of a pen
register required a warrant. Id.
92
See id. at 735–36 (“When petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
phone company . . . he assumed the risk that the company would reveal the information to
the police.”).
93
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 890 (1984) (providing another exception to the
warrant requirement, which allows police officers acting in good faith to be excused from
minor defects in the warrant process). In this landmark case, the police officer gathered
information from an informant and subsequently procured a judge-issued search warrant.
Id. The search turned up evidence that the suspect was indeed involved in a drug dealing
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attempted to fulfill the warrant process, but some type of a defect in the
warrant process has occurred.94 In general, the rationale for this rule is
that an officer who has relied on a judge’s approval of a warrant should
not be penalized by having the evidence excluded for trial due to a
warrant defect.95
The Supreme Court has also had occasion to rule on the
Constitutionality of unwarranted location tracking. 96 In Kyllo v. United
States, the Court held that unwarranted location tracking inside the home
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.97 In this case, the Court narrowly
found that law enforcement agencies did not have the right to use infrared
sensors to track a suspect’s location inside his home without a warrant. 98
However, the case left some ambiguity as to the privacy individuals
should expect in public areas because Justice Scalia relied heavily on the
fact that the home has a heightened expectation of privacy. 99
The Court partially addressed this ambiguity in United States v. Jones,
where it held that an unwarranted use of a GPS tracking device violated

operation, but the warrant was found to be lacking probable cause after the search had
already occurred. Id. at 923. See also Edna F. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The
Reasonable Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 658 (1978)
(explaining that two common scenarios exist whereby the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule may be permitted under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). The first
such scenario occurs where a police officer makes a mistake in judgment when determining
whether probable cause exists to support a warrant. Id. The second situation occurs where
an officer relies on a mistake in fact, for example relying on a defected warrant. Id.
94
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (“[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”).
95
See id. at 923 (distinguishing that this exclusion will not always apply even if a warrant
has been issued, and holding that a baseline analysis of reasonableness needs to be
determined on a case-by-case basis).
96
See Hernandez, supra note 54 (explaining the Stingray’s ability to track cellphones by
acting as a fake cell tower and requesting the phone’s location information). See also Jack I.
Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the “Long View” on the Fourth Amendment: Stored
Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 14 (2008) (arguing that the
Kyllo v. United States decision reinforced that the home has a high degree of privacy that
would not be experienced in more public places).
97
See 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (finding an unwarranted search had occurred after police used
infrared heat sensors to analyze heat radiations emitted from a suspect’s home without first
getting a warrant). The information gathered from the device led to the police being granted
a search warrant based on probable cause that the heat radiations signified a likelihood that
the suspect was growing marijuana inside the home. Id. at 30, 40.
98
See id. at 40 (holding that law enforcement must get a warrant before using thermal
imaging equipment that can look through the walls of a suspect’s home).
99
See id. at 33 (distinguishing this case from a past case that held that aerial photography
of an industrial complex was not a search chiefly because of the special sanctity of the home).
See also U.S. CONST. amend IV (making specific mention to “houses” in the prefatory
language of the Fourth Amendment).
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the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches.100 The
Court relied on the common law trespass doctrine in finding that
attaching a GPS device to a vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.101 Thus, under the Jones reasoning, the physical attachment
itself was enough to trigger Fourth Amendment protection because a
trespass had been traditionally linked with the protection from
government intrusion.102
Notably, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review an Eleventh
Circuit decision, where law enforcement agents gathered cellphone
location data from a cellphone service provider with a court order rather
than a warrant.103 The government gathered the location of the petitioner
in relation to the cell tower during incoming and outgoing calls. 104 The
Eleventh Circuit found that cellphone location data gathered from a cell
service provider—a third party—is not subject to the Fourth
Amendment.105 The Fourth Circuit ruled similarly and relied on the thirdparty doctrine in holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy
in the cellphone location data that was gathered by the phone company

100
See 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (holding that the installation of a GPS on a suspect’s vehicle
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
101
See id. at 949 (describing the historical connection between the tort trespass doctrine and
Fourth Amendment searches). See also Brittany Boatman, United States v. Jones: The Foolish
Revival of the Trespass Doctrine in Addressing GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 47
VAL. U. L. REV. 677, 683–84 (2013) (explaining that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in the
Jones decision “revived” the trespass doctrine and extended the word “effect” from Fourth
Amendment to include a person’s vehicle); supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing
the relevant text of the Fourth Amendment).
102
See 132 S. Ct. at 949 (relying on historical arguments that the founders created the Fourth
Amendment to protect the citizenry from physical intrusion).
103
See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479
(2015) (denying certiorari to hear appeal). The defense wanted evidence related to cellphone
records to be discarded. Id. They argued that the procurement of evidence from the phone
company by court order was in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the government
had not made a requisite showing of probable cause. Id.
104
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 573 Fed. Appx. 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), and on reh’g en banc in part, 785
F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (stating that the prosecution relied
on the cell location data in its case in chief). See also Dana Kerr, Court Rules Police Need
Warrant for Cell Phone Location Tracking, CNET (June 11, 2014), https://www.cnet.com/
news/court-police-need-warrant-for-cell-phone-location-tracking/
[https://perma.cc/
K7VB-GSQV] (providing detailed relevant facts of the Davis case). Specifically, the
defendant was charged with several counts of robbery of gas stations and restaurants and
that the cell tower location data put the defendant in close proximity to all of the crimes at
the times when they occurred. Id.
105
See Davis, 785 F.3d at 518 (holding that the ultimate test for a Fourth Amendment was
reasonableness and that the government had conducted a reasonable search).
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and obtained by the government. 106 However, despite very limited case
law regarding the Stingray, courts have not extended these decisions to
location data gathered by the Stingray.107
D. Federal and State Legislative and Administrative Standards Applicable to the
Stingray
Several sources of state and federal law and policy are potentially
applicable to the Stingray.108 Among the most important sources are the
federal pen register and trace statute, the “Wiretap Act,” a proposed
federal Stingray Act, state-level Stingray legislation, and a Department of
Justice (DOJ) policy.109
1.

The Federal Pen Register and Trace Statute

The Constitutional standard that applies to law enforcement oversight
of incoming and outgoing calls is a low bar due to the previously
discussed Smith v. Maryland Supreme Court decision that held that pen
register use falls under the third-party doctrine.110 In an attempt to create
some statuary guidance, Congress enacted the pen register and Trace
Statute (“Section 3123”), which requires judges to issue an order allowing
the use of the pen register.111 Under this statute, a law enforcement officer
or prosecutor is required to name the identity of the person making the

106
See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that historical
cellphone location data falls within the third-party doctrine and is thus not subject to warrant
requirement). See also Jeremy Derman, Constitutional Law—Maryland District Court Finds
Government's Acquisition of Historical Cell Site Data Immune from Fourth Amendment—United
States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012), 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 297, 298 (2013)
(explaining that the District Court granted a court order under the Stored Communications
Act based off of a “specific and articulable facts” standard, but this standard did not rise to
the typical Fourth Amendment warrant requirement of probable cause).
107
See Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 353 (Md. Spec. App. 2016) (holding that the
unwarranted use of a Stingray-like device violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation
of privacy). See also United States v. Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d 606, 615 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016)
(distinguishing Stingray technology from cell tower location data from the service provider
because the user does not voluntarily allow the Stingray to intercept the connection to the cell
tower).
108
See supra Part II.C (addressing the Federal Pen Register and Trace Statute, the Wiretap
Act, and the proposed Stingray Privacy Act).
109
See infra Part D.1–3 (analyzing the federal statutory sources that are currently enacted,
as well as proposed federal legislation and DOJ policy).
110
See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text (explaining how information gathered by
a pen register falls under the third-party doctrine).
111
See 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012) (“no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and
trace device without first obtaining a court order [pursuant to the application procedure in
the statute]”).
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request and to certify that the information gathered is relevant to an
ongoing police investigation.112
The 1986 statute allowed for no judicial oversight for similar online
information because the statute was set up specifically for landline
telephone communications.113 To remedy this lack of statutory coverage,
the Patriot Act of 2001 amended and broadened the 1986 definition of
“pen register” so it could protect online communications with the same
modest privacy protections.114 The amended definitions are much more
expansive and not telephone-specific.115
In fact, it is now believed that the Federal Pen Register Statute is
exactly what local and federal law enforcement agents may have been, or
may still be, using before conducting a search with the Stingray.116 The
See id. (setting the judicial standard for reviewing the application for a Pen/Trace
order). The application process is made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3122, which states:
[The contents of the application shall include] . . . [b](1) the identity of
the attorney for the Government or the State law enforcement or
investigative officer making the application and the identity of the law
enforcement agency conducting the investigation; and . . . [b](2) a
certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained
is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that
agency.
Id.
113
See generally U.S.C. § 3127 (2016) (lacking definitions to the chapter that would apply to
electronic communications over Internet or cellphone platforms).
114
See id. (expanding the definitions of “wire communication,” “trap and trace device,”
and “pen register”).
115
See id. (providing the new definitions for the procedure). In full these provisions define
the terms “pen register” and “trap and trace device,” as follows:
[T]he term “pen register” means a device or process which records or
decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication, but
such term does not include any device or process used by a provider or
customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or
recording as an incident to billing, for communications services
provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider
or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or
other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business . . . [T]he term
“trap and trace device” means a device or process which captures the
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating
number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
communication, provided, however, that such information shall not
include the contents of any communication.
Id. § (3)–(4) (emphasis added).
116
See Ryan Gallagher, Feds Accused of Hiding Information From Judges about Covert Cellphone
Tracking Tool, SLATE (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/
03/28/stingray_surveillance_technology_used_without_proper_approval_report.html
112
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question then, is whether the Stingray, which is capable of much more
than a traditional pen register, is subject to the standard court order or
requires a warrant.117 At this time, the question remains unanswered, and
judges are forced to grapple with the problem on Constitutional rather
than statutory grounds.118
2.

The Federal “Wiretap Act” Provides Recourse For Victims of
Electronic Privacy Invasion

Another potentially-applicable statute is the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act (“Wiretap Act”). 119 A claim brought against a private
citizen and a law enforcement officer can be distinguished under this
Act.120 If private citizens are alleged to have used surveillance technology
to eavesdrop on a third party, they may be subject to harsh criminal and
civil penalties.121 However, in many circuits the statute is interpreted as
giving qualified immunity to law enforcement officers. 122 In other
[https://perma.cc/NV8L-CW3Q] (explaining that the pen/trace application applies to “a
type of surveillance that does not usually require a search warrant because it records only
metadata—the who, where, and when of a communication but not the content”). The article
states that local and federal law enforcement agencies likely used the Pen/Trace statute to
get court permission to use the Stingray, relying on documents gathered by the ACLU. Id.
See also Jenna McLaughlin, How Chicago Police Convinced Courts to Let Them Track Cellphones
Without a Warrant, INTERCEPT (Oct. 18, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/10/18/howchicago-police-convinced-courts-to-let-them-track-cellphones-without-a-warrant/
[https://perma.cc/MD63-KYYQ] (examining the recently-released pen register applications
that the Chicago police department used before requesting to use the Stingray, most of which
only referred to the Stingray as a “digital analyzer” having the capability to gather signal
emissions from a targeted cellphone).
117
See Greenemeier, supra note 61 (arguing that the pen register standard is too low of a
bar for the Stingray’s capabilities).
118
See Grace Vandemark, Stingray Tracking Technology, SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (ABC-CLIO 2016) (explaining that in the
limited amount of cases involving the Stingray, courts have been split as to whether they
require a warrant).
119
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (detailing various unlawful activities relating to
intercepting electronic information); Frederick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liability for All,
Privacy for None: The Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasively Electronic World,
41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1481, 1516 (2007) (arguing that the Wiretap Act as well as a miscellany of
other federal privacy statutes have failed to keep up with the ever-developing technology in
the age of the internet).
120
See 18 U.S.C. § 2551 (setting different standards for private citizens and those “acting
under the color of law”).
121
See id. § 2511(4)–(5) (providing that violators can be subject to fines, civil liability and
up to five years of imprisonment).
122
See id. § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under
color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception.”). See also Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Qualified Immunity as
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jurisdictions, immunity for law enforcement can still exist depending on
varying definitions of the good-faith defense.123 Regardless, it would be
difficult for a private citizen to actually prove that a police officer was
using the technology irresponsibly. 124
Notably, one recent case faced the issue of whether a wiretap warrant
issued for a Stingray complied with the Fourth Amendment.125 The Court
held that the wiretap warrant was sufficient because it was based on
probable cause and it adequately detailed the scope of the search so as to
comply with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. 126
Furthermore, the Court held that even if the warrant were invalid, it
would have fallen within the “good faith” exception. 127
3.

The Proposed “Stingray Privacy Act of 2015,” State-Based Stingray
Legislation, and A New DOJ Policy Seek To Monitor the Stingray

Due to these issues, legislators on Capitol Hill have taken notice of
privacy concerns of the Stingray. 128 On November 2, 2015, “The Stingray
Defense in Suit under Federal Wiretap Act, 178 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (Originally published in 2002)
(discussing the different approaches by circuits regarding the good-faith defense and
qualified immunity).
123
See Porto, supra note 122 (analyzing federal cases where the qualified immunity defense
has been invoked).
124
See Hernandez, supra note 54 (demonstrating that users have no idea that the Stingray
has connected to their cellphone). But see Lilly Hay Newman, Now There’s an App For
Detecting
Government
Stingray
Cell
Phone
Trackers,
SLATE (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/12/31/snoopsnitch_is_an_app_by_the_
german_srlabs_that_detects_imsi_catchers_stingrays.html
[https://perma.cc/5GNB3DNL] (detailing a promising new app called “SnoopSnitch,” which claims to be able to tell
a user if a Stingray has connected to their phone).
125
See United States v. Tutis, Crim. No. 14-699, 2016 WL 6136577, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016)
(holding that under the circumstances the warrant requirement was fulfilled). In this case,
the suspect in a drug trafficking conspiracy was allegedly cycling through several cellphones
with the purpose of thwarting law enforcement. Id. at *2. To streamline the investigation,
the officers applied for a wiretap order to use a Stingray-like device for the sole purpose of
determining which cellphone belonged to the user, and the warrant was granted. Id.
126
See id. at *5 (finding that probable cause was satisfied by evidence of known drug
trafficking activities and the constant switching of cellphones). The judge also found that
even though the government did not specifically say that a Stingray was going to be used,
the fact that the device’s capabilities to the extent that it would determine his cellphone
number was adequate for purposes of the wiretap order. Id.
127
See id. at *8 (holding that the good faith requirement would have been satisfied even if
the wiretap order did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment because a police officer acting upon
the issuance of the wiretap order would have reasonable belief that the order satisfied the
Fourth Amendment). See also Ball, supra note 93, at 635–36 (explaining the doctrine of good
faith as it relates to the Fourth Amendment).
128
See Dennis Romboy, Chaffetz Aims to Restrict Police Use of “Stingrays” to Capture Cellphone
Info, DESERTNEWS (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865640580/
Chaffetz-aims-to-restrict-police-use-of-stingrays-to-capture-cellphone-info.html?pg=all
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Privacy Act of 2015” was introduced into the House of Representatives. 129
According to Representative Jason Chaffetz, a co-sponsor of the Stingray

[https://perma.cc/FT9M-PC79] (reporting Representative Jason Chaffetz’s concerns about
unwarranted Stingray use).
129
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015) (detailing a warrant
procedure and criminalizing citizen-use of the Stingray). In full the act provides:
(a) Prohibition Of Use.—Except as provided in subsection (d), anyone
who knowingly uses a cell-site simulator shall be punished as provided
in subsection (b).
(b) Penalty.—The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is a
fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.
(c) Prohibition Of Use As Evidence.—No information acquired through
the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a), and no
evidence derived therefrom, may be received in evidence in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof.
(d) Exceptions.—Subsection (a) does not apply to the following:
(1) Warrant—Use of a cell-site simulator by a governmental entity
under a warrant issued under the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court,
issued under State warrant procedures) by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(2) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.—Use of a cellsite simulator by a governmental entity to conduct electronic
surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Service Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(3) Emergency—Subject to subsection (e), use of a cell-site
simulator by a governmental entity, if—
(A) such governmental entity reasonably determines an
emergency exists that—
(i) involves—
(I) immediate danger of death or serious physical
injury to any person;
(II) conspiratorial activities threatening the national
security interest; or
(III) conspiratorial activities characteristic of
organized crime; and
(ii) requires use of a cell-site simulator before a warrant
can, with due diligence, be obtained;
(B) there are grounds upon which a warrant could be entered
to authorize such use; and
(C) such governmental entity applies for a warrant approving
such use not later than 48 hours after such use begins.
(e) Termination Of Emergency Use.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—A governmental entity shall immediately
terminate use of a cell-site simulator under subsection (d)(3) when
the information sought is obtained or when the application for a
warrant is denied, whichever is earlier.
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Protection Act, “[t]he abuse of stingrays and other cell site simulators by
individuals, including law enforcement, could enable gross violations of
privacy.”130
The Stingray is not just in the hands of federal agencies.131 Currently
twenty-three states are known to have access to the Stingray. 132
Widespread police possession has caused state lawmakers across the
country to enact legislation.133 Amid major criticism from privacy
advocates, the DOJ created a policy that purportedly requires federal
agents to get a warrant before using the Stingray. 134 Still, the question

Id.

(2) PROHIBITION ON USE AS EVIDENCE.—If an application for
a warrant under subsection (d)(3) is denied, any information or
evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator shall be subject
to subsection (c) and an inventory shall be served on each person
named in the application.

See Romboy, supra note 128 (explaining Representative Jason Chaffetz’s policy position
regarding the Stingray device).
131
See Who’s Got Them?, supra note 62 (providing the federal agencies known to use the
Stingray, include: the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the United States Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the United States Marshal Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Explosives, the
Internal Revenue Service, the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States
Marine Corps, the United States National Guard, the United States Special Operations
Command, and the National Security Agency).
132
See id. (illustrating in a fifty-state survey all of the state and local law enforcement
agencies known to use the Stingray, including: Alaska, Arizona, California, Washington
D.C., Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
133
Several states have enacted legislation that sets out some guidelines for Stingrays,
however some of the legislative aim is in response to attachment of only GPS devices. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 (2016) (providing in-depth warrant requirements before police
interception, but with some exceptions); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-12 (2015) (setting a standard
that police need to gain a warrant, but allowing potentially broad exceptions); MINN.
STAT. § 626A.42 (2014) (providing that evidence for warrantless gathering of location data
will be inadmissible with some exceptions); MONT. CODE § 46-5-110 (2015) (enacting
standard that applies to any police tracking of wireless devices); TENN. CODE § 39-13-610
(2014) (requiring police to get a warrant, but allowing several exceptions); UTAH CODE § 7723c-102 (2014) (disallowing warrantless location evidence but providing judicial discretion
in allowing evidence); VA. CODE § 19.2-56.2 (2012) (providing that police must get a warrant
before using tracking location with exceptions); LA. STAT. § 14:222.3 (2016); H.B. No. 1440,
Wash. Sixty-Fourth Leg., First Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (speaking directly to inadmissibility
of evidence gathered by a cell-simulator device); Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 99-622 (S.B. 2343) (2016)
(requiring that police quash any evidence not related to the investigation provided in the
search warrant).
134
See Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology (Sept. 3,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policyuse-cell-site-simulators [https://perma.cc/7CEA-KEP9] (providing a warrant procedure for
all federal employees seeking to use a Stingray).
130
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remains how the states and federal government will deal with the everadvancing technology.135 This Note proposes a three-pronged approach
that states can use to deter use of unwarranted Stingray searches. 136
III. ANALYSIS
Several of the aforementioned constitutional and statutory standards
likely apply, at least to some degree, to the Stingray.137 This section
explores how these various legal standards may apply to the warrantless
use of the Stingray.138 First, Part III.A analyzes the underlying
constitutional questions regarding the third-party doctrine and weighs its
applicability to police use of the Stingray, concluding that the third-party
doctrine is inappropriate for police data gathered by the Stingray. 139 Then,
Part III.B examines various federal statutory standards that may apply to
the use of the Stingray, and concludes that federal law is not currently
equipped to deal with the Stingray’s capabilities. 140 Finally, Part III.C
shows that the state legislatures have enacted statutes that are effectively
filling in the gaps left from the lack of federal statutes. 141
A. The Third-Party Doctrine Is Inappropriate for the Stingray
The third-party doctrine helps define the meaning of a “reasonable”
search under the Fourth Amendment.142 Well before the Stingray was
discovered, there was significant scholarly debate about the usefulness of
the third-party doctrine in general.143 Proponents of the third-party
135
See infra Part III (analyzing the existing federal guidance, including the Wiretap Act and
the Pen Register Statute, as well as a Department of Justice Policy, and a flood of state-level
Stingray legislation).
136
See infra Part IV (proposing that states should introduce a three-pronged approach to
combat unwarranted use of the Stingray).
137
See supra Part III.C–D (providing information regarding Supreme Court cases involving
the unwarranted use of the Stingray, and discussing legislative and policy guidance).
138
See infra Part III (analyzing how current legal standards may apply to the unwarranted
use of the Stingray by police officers).
139
See infra Part III.A (addressing the potential applicability of the third-party doctrine to
the Stingray).
140
See infra Part III.B (determining that the federal “Wiretap Act,” and pen register statute
are not equipped to deal with the multiple capabilities of the Stingray).
141
See infra Part III.C (assessing the strengths and weaknesses of currently-enacted statutes
from states that have enacted laws pertaining to Stingrays).
142
See supra Part II.A (describing the key components of the third-party doctrine). See also
Stern, supra note 90, at 364 (explaining that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy
to information shared with bank, phone carrier, or credit card company).
143
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107(4) MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
(2009) (arguing in favor of the third-party doctrine on public policy grounds). But see, e.g.,
Erin Murphy, The Case against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr,
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doctrine say that in the absence of the rule, criminals would use the Fourth
Amendment as a shield to an otherwise-public act.144 This argument relies
on the premise that Fourth Amendment protections are inapplicable in
public places, and instead the Fourth Amendment is only surmised to
protect privacy in inherently private places. 145 It also relies on the idea
that a criminal actor could then take advantage of the third-party doctrine
by essentially using only third-party platforms.146 But if the Stingray is
able to make sweeping searches of the entire public, nowhere can truly be
considered a private place if the user owns a cellphone.147 Furthermore,
the reliance on the argument that criminal actors can take advantage of
their cellphones to perform criminal tasks is not well taken because police
still have the ability to use the Stingray, but simply must get a warrant
based on probable cause.148 Thus, a sweeping search of cellphone data
and contents, with no probable cause, does not serve either of the major
arguments in favor of the third-party doctrine.149
The traditional arguments against the third-party doctrine further
undermine this argument in two ways. 150 The first argument is that most
people have an expectation of privacy in information given voluntarily to
third-parties.151 Currently, phone records collected from the phone carrier

24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1240–41 (2009) (refuting arguments by Kerr that public policy
favors the third-party doctrine).
144
See Kerr, supra note 143, at 561 (outlining primary arguments in favor of the third-party
doctrine). See also United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 989 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(detailing that in the Rigmaiden proceeding the judge denied the defendant’s advanced
discovery requests in part because the requested information would advantage criminals).
145
See Kerr, supra note 143, at 574 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment allows police to
make practical investigations in public places to gather evidence that may lead to establish
the probable cause that allows for a warrant).
146
See Kerr, supra note 143, at 581 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment should keep the
third-party doctrine alive even in the face of developing technology, the absence of which
would essentially give criminals the upper hand).
147
See Murphy, supra note 143, at 1249 (arguing that the public domain is not always
expected to be an area that is inherently subject to no privacy protections).
148
See supra Part II.C (explaining the traditional warrant requirements). See also Eric M.
Yesner, Government Surveillance through New Technology: Rethinking the Third-Party Doctrine's
Implications on the Fourth Amendment, 19 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 140 (2015)
(positing that the evolution of new technology has unequivocally been tilted toward
heightened citizen surveillance, and that government spying has become much easier with
an antiquated third-party doctrine).
149
See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text (analyzing the capabilities of the Stingray
in light of arguments in favor of the third-party doctrine).
150
See Kerr, supra note 143, at 562 (detailing the two main arguments against the thirdparty doctrine).
151
See Kerr, supra note 143, at 563 (providing the first argument given by opponents of the
third-party doctrine, and refuting the argument).
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are generally not subject to a warrant.152 However, the Stingray goes
beyond specific data collected against a particular person because it has
the ability to gather and receive location, user identifying information, and
communications of several users instantly and proactively. 153
The second argument is that with the presence of the third-party
doctrine, police power becomes too far-reaching.154 The Stingray is the
perfect example of how the police power can become too far-reaching with
developing technology.155 The Stingray allows sweep searches, and
although the use of a cellphone may be voluntary, the expectation of
privacy that each individual has when using their cellphone seems to
outweigh the interest the police may have in using the Stingray for public
safety.156
Furthermore, the Stingray likely does not conform to the traditional
third-party doctrine as set forth in Smith v. Maryland.157 Regardless of the
position taken on the third-party doctrine, the Stingray goes beyond what
could be considered information given voluntarily to a third-party.158 One
of the first Stingray cases to hit the federal circuit, United States v. Lambis,
addressed this issue.159 The court, in ruling against the application of the
third-party doctrine, stated:

152
Compare United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that
historical cellphone location data falls within the third-party doctrine and is thus not subject
to warrant requirement) with U.S. v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 573 Fed. Appx. 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), and on reh’g en banc
in part, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (holding in part that the
third-party doctrine is applicable to historical cellphone data gathered by a law enforcement
agency and thus upholding a conviction despite Fourth Amendment challenges to the issued
court order).
153
See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining the various capabilities of the Stingray and how police
can search the contents of any cellphone within its radius).
154
See Kerr, supra note 143, at 583–84 (refuting the argument that police power is too strong
under the third-party doctrine by pointing out that other doctrines, such as entrapment, are
used to promote a less-far-reaching police state).
155
See Owsley, supra note 76, at 192–93 (explaining the way in which police can circumvent
typical privacy expectations when using the Stingray).
156
See Owsley, supra note 76, at 227, 230 (weighing the privacy interests of individuals in
the use of their cellphones and explaining how the Stingray goes beyond the amount of
privacy that is expected by the Fourth Amendment).
157
See United States v. Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d 606, 615–16 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016) (finding
that the Stingray does not fit within the third-party doctrine).
158
Compare Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (relying heavily on the fact that the user
of a telephone gives information over to a third party voluntarily in justifying no Fourth
Amendment protection from the use of a pen register) (emphasis added) with Lambis, 197
F.Supp.3d at 615 (finding that the user of a cellphone has not voluntarily surrendered
cellphone information when law enforcement uses a Stingray tracking device).
159
See Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d at 614 (holding that a Stingray has different capabilities and
thus should be distinguished from the pen register device used in Smith).
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For instance, in Smith, the Supreme Court found that pen
register information is subject to the third party doctrine
because “[a]ll telephone users realize that they must
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since
it is through telephone company switching equipment
that their calls are completed.” However, the location
information detected by a cell-site simulator is different
in kind from pen register information: it is neither initiated
by the user nor sent to a third party.160
The final sentence makes two very important arguments. 161 First, the
Stingray “is not initiated by the user.”162 Recall that the Stingray works by
deploying a “man-in-the-middle attack.”163
The Stingray actively
connects to users’ cellphones without their knowledge. 164 Thus, although
cellphone users may have voluntarily sent information to the cellphone
service provider, they have not given any information voluntarily to the
Stingray user.165
The second argument is “nor [is the user’s cellphone information] sent
to a third party.”166 The government’s use of the Stingray can be
contrasted to a situation like the one in United States v. Davis, where the
government gathered the information directly from the third party (i.e.,
the phone carrier).167 With the Stingray, the user is not technically sending
the information to a third party at all.168 Instead, the Stingray is

Id. (internal citations omitted and italics added for emphasis).
See id. (“[h]owever, the location information detected by a cell-site simulator is different
in kind from pen register information: it is neither initiated by the user nor sent to a third party”
(emphasis added)).
162
See id. (providing that the cellphone user does not voluntarily send over information to
a third-party).
163
See Kolker, supra note 53 and accompanying text (detailing how the Stingray gathers
information from a user’s cellular telephone without the user or the third-party telephone
provider’s knowledge).
164
See id. (explaining how users have no indication that a Stingray has connected to their
cellphone).
165
See Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d 606 at 615 (detailing the difference between the voluntariness
of sending the information to a cell service provider rather than directly to a cell-site
simulator).
166
Id.
167
See id. (analyzing the arguments advanced by the varying circuits about whether
cellphone information given voluntarily to a third-party phone carrier falls under the thirdparty doctrine, but concluding arguendo that even if it does qualify, the data gathered from a
Stingray goes beyond because the third-party phone carrier is completely uninvolved).
168
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (explaining that the Stingray actively
intercepts data from third parties, and does not involve the third-party in gleaning the
information).
160
161
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intercepting the message directly.169 Thus, the “third-party” link is
completely broken because the government has interacted directly with
the user’s cellphone.170
B. The Federal Law Is Beyond the Curve with the Stingray
At the federal level, privacy law is arguably behind the curve in many
respects.171 This Part deals with federal laws that may be specifically
applicable to the Stingray, and demonstrates that the laws are not
designed to keep up with technology such as the Stingray. 172 First, Part
III.B.1 analyzes U.S.C. § 3123 (“the Federal Pen Register Statute”) and
explains why the statute is too low of a bar for the Stingray. 173 Then, Part
III.B.2 discusses why the Wiretap Act is also not well-suited to provide a
legislative standard for the Stingray.174 Finally, Part III.B.3 discusses the
proposed Stingray Privacy Act of 2015.175
1.

U.S.C. § 3123 Is Too Low of a Standard for the Stingray

As it applies to the Stingray’s ability to view call records, the broad
discretion of law enforcement under United States Code § 3123 would
permit Stingray use by police, but only if viewing call records was the
device’s sole capability.176 Recall that this statute—originally enacted for
landlines—gives police only two requirements before gaining access to the
information: (1) police officers or prosecutors must state their identity,
and (2) make a showing that the information requested is relevant to an

169
See Hernandez, supra note 54 and accompanying text (clarifying that the Stingray acts
exclusively as a fake tower to intercept the information).
170
See Klonick, supra note 44 (explaining that the police have the ability to connect to the
devices of several users within the radius of the Stingray without consent of the user or
service provider).
171
But cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“The fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information
any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”).
172
See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Wiretap Act, the pen register statute, and proposed
legislation to limit Stingrays).
173
See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining why U.S.C. § 3123 does not adequately provide for the
multiple intrusive uses of the Stingray).
174
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the Wiretap Act and concluding that the Act only applies
to intercepted communications while leaving broad immunity to anyone acting “under the
color of law.”).
175
See infra Part III.B.3 (addressing the proposed Federal Stingray legislation, including
some of its strengths and weaknesses).
176
See supra note 112 (providing the statutory language and relevant provisions of the
application procedure under § 3123).
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ongoing criminal investigation. 177 Additionally, this statute does not have
an exclusionary rule, so evidence acquired from botching this procedure
will not be thrown out by a judge.178
The New York Police Department (NYPD) gives a practical example
of how low the bar is under § 3123.179 The common practice of the NYPD
is to simply subpoena a phone carrier to gain access to a cellphone user’s
call information in cases where a cellphone has been stolen. 180 The issue
is that, with no exclusionary rule and not constitutionally establishing a
search under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement agencies have an
almost unchecked ability to catalogue phone records of limitless people
with no judicial oversight.181
2.

The Wiretap Act Is Ill-Suited To Regulate the Stingray Because the
Stingray Is Untraceable and Can Intercept Multiple Users’
Communications at One Time

One argument is that if the technology were to be used
indiscriminately to intercept communications, the Wiretap Act could be
triggered.182 The Wiretap Act requires that police officers have probable
cause and go through all the typical procedures for getting a warrant. 183
For instance, assume that verifiable evidence exists that a police officer
used intercepted communication with the Stingray without a warrant,
even though the suspect was completely free of guilt. 184 Under these
177
See 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (b)(1)–(2) (2016) (detailing the procedure by which police officers
and prosecutors can be granted a pen register).
178
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2016) (lacking any exclusionary rule in the statutory
language).
179
See Joseph Goldstein, City is Amassing Trove of Cellphone Logs, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov.
26, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/nyregion/new-york-city-police-amassing
-a-trove-of-cellphone-logs.html?hpw&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/JD9T-ZNQK] (illustrating
how it is commonplace for the NYPD to subpoena phone carriers and collect massive
amounts of information without getting a warrant).
180
See id. (describing the large database of information that the New York Police
Department has acquired from the practice of subpoenaing the phone companies, with no
questions asked by the companies when they furnish the information).
181
See id. (explaining that T-Mobile handed over cellphone numbers from 297 police
subpoenas in a single month without hesitation).
182
See Christopher Izant, Note, Stingray Surveillance: Legal Rules by Statute or Subsumption,
HARV. L. NAT’L SEC. J. (July 15, 2016) http://harvardnsj.org/2016/07/stingray-surveillancelegal-rules-by-statute-or-subsumption/ [https://perma.cc/X9LT-WP2Q] (arguing that
under the Wiretap Act, any content collected by the Stingray would be subjected to the morestringent record keeping and time limit rules as promulgated in the statute).
183
See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012) (providing that police officers get a warrant before using
evidence obtained by interception of wire or oral communications, with any evidence being
acquired without a warrant being excluded from use in the courtroom).
184
Hypothetical situation posed by the author.
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circumstances, could a suspect sue the government for violating his
privacy rights?185 As mentioned earlier, the Wiretap Act gives wideranging immunity to police officers “acting under the color of law.” 186
Therefore, in some cases, police officers may receive qualified immunity
if they neglected to get a warrant before intercepting communications.187
Another difficulty in typical regulation is that a citizen has no way of
knowing if a police officer has used the Stingray, as the user has no
indication that a Stingray was connected to or disconnected from their
cellphone.188
The Stingray has the ability to track location and to intercept
communications, both of which go much further than viewing call logs.189
These capabilities may qualify as a Fourth Amendment search based on
Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, which would
require a warrant.190 Furthermore, the Stingray has the capability of
intercepting multiple users’ communications with one use.191

185
It is possible that a citizen could file a Bivens action in such a case. In any case, one can
only imagine the difficulty in first, knowing that a Stingray in fact connected to your
cellphone, and second, proving that a particular officer violated your constitutional rights in
using the particular technology. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
186
See Porto, supra note 122 (explaining how some circuits have interpreted the Wiretap
Act as giving police officers qualified immunity).
187
See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text (distinguishing between causes of action
brought against citizens and those brought against police officers).
188
See supra notes 53–4 (providing background information on how the Stingray can be
used without the cellphone user having any knowledge).
189
See Hernandez, supra note 54 (describing how Stingrays can track all users’ location
within range without the users’ knowledge). See also Zetter, supra note 53 (explaining that
the Stingray has the ability to intercept text messages and phone calls).
190
See Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 353 (Md. Spec. App. 2016) (holding that the
unwarranted use of a Stingray-like device violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation
of privacy). See also United States v. Lambis, 197 F.Supp.3d 606, at 606–11 (S.D.N.Y. July 12,
2016) (denying admission of evidence gathered from a Stingray on Constitutional grounds).
But see U.S. v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
573 Fed. Appx. 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), and on reh’g en banc in part, 785 F.3d 498
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (allowing the government to gather
cellphone data directly from the service provider under an interpretation of constitutional
reasonableness).
191
See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (denying
issuance of a pen register, citing to the fact that “[the government] did not address what the
government would do with the cell phone numbers and other information concerning
seemingly innocent cell phone users whose information was recorded by the equipment”).
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Federal Legislation Is a Slow, Dubious Process and the CurrentlyProposed Federal Legislation Does Not Go Far Enough

The Stingray Privacy Act of 2015 is currently in committee in the
United States House of Representatives. 192 The bill closely resembles the
DOJ’s policy that requires federal agents to get a warrant before deploying
the device; however, the bill, unlike the DOJ’s policy, is actually legally
enforceable if it gets passed.193 Facially, the proposed law grapples with
some of the problems brought forth by the Stingray and fills in some gaps
of federal statutory coverage.194
The bill has a “prohibition of use” clause.195 This clause criminalizes
the use of the Stingray by either an indeterminate fine or up to ten years
imprisonment.196 The bill’s cosponsor has said that this clause would
serve as a method of specific deterrence for police wishing to abuse the
Stingray.197 However, the clause also addresses another concern, in that
members of the public have gained increased access to the Stingray.198
Section (c) of the proposed Stingray Protection Act of 2015 introduces
an evidence-inadmissibility rule.199 The rule provides that any evidence
gathered by a Stingray without a warrant is inadmissible, subject to some
192
See generally Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (proposing new standards for use of the Stingray).
193
See Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology, DOJ (Sept.
3,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhancedpolicy-use-cell-site-simulators (providing a warrant procedure for all federal employees
seeking to use a Stingray). See also Izant, supra note 182 (stating that the DOJ’s policy is only
policy and thus not legally enforceable).
194
See supra Part III.B (discussing the holes in the current federal law as it relates to
controlling police use of the Stingray).
195
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (a) (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (providing that knowingly using a cell-site simulator is prohibited and punishable
by law, and any evidence gathered from unwarranted police use will be discarded subject to
exceptions).
196
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (b) (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (exacting a penalty of up to ten years imprisonment for violation of the prohibition
of use clause).
197
See Steven Nelson, Bill: Give Cops up to 10 Years in Prison for Warrantless Phone Tracking,
U.S. NEWS (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/11/03/
congressmen-cops-should-face-10-years-in-prison-for-warrantless-phone-tracking
[https://perma.cc/533K-CVAW] (according to Representative Peter Welch, “the penalty is
there as a deterrent”).
198
See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 63, at 75 (explaining that the market for the Stingray has
made the devices available to the public). See also Kolker, supra note 53 (revealing that the
price to buy less-sophisticated versions of the Stingray device are as low as $1,800 on foreign
websites).
199
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (c) (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (establishing that all evidence gathered without a warrant will be inadmissible in a
courtroom).
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potentially problematic exceptions.200 The first questionable exception to
the inadmissibility rule is “an emergency . . . that is reasonably
determined to involve . . . conspiratorial activities characteristic of
organized crime.”201 The problem with this exception is that “organized
crime” can be broadly defined.202 Furthermore, the Stingray is mainly
used for serious situations involving crime that could be reasonably
considered organized.203
Second, an additional exception applies during an emergency that is
reasonably determined to involve “conspiratorial activities threatening
the national security interest.”204 This exception is also broadly defined.205
The clause lacks clarity as to whether certain agencies, such as the Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or the Department of Homeland Security would ever be
subject to a warrant requirement because those agencies are designed
specifically to protect national security interests. 206
Finally, perhaps the most problematic exception of all states that “[the
warrant-requirement does not apply] . . . [and] there are grounds upon
which a warrant could be entered to authorize such use.”207 The main
concern with this exception is that it directly contradicts the Fourth
Amendment as interpreted in Katz.208 The Supreme Court expressly
rejected the government’s claim that evidence from electronic surveillance
200
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (c) (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (proving several broad exceptions to the rule).
201
Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (b) (2015), full text at supra note
129.
202
See Organized Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining organized
crime as: “1. Widespread criminal activities that are coordinated and controlled through a
central syndicate . . . 2. Persons involved in these criminal activities; a syndicate of criminals
who rely on their unlawful activities for income.”).
203
See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing situations where the Stingray is
generally deployed by police officers). But see John Campbell, LAPD Spied on 21 Using
StingRay Anti-Terrorism Tool, LA WEEKLY (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.laweekly.com/news/
lapd-spied-on-21-using-stingray-anti-terrorism-tool-2612739
[https://perma.cc/F7PLC3RQ] (exposing the widespread use of the Stingray by the LAPD, using the device over
twenty-one times in a four month period for seemingly routine investigations).
204
Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871(d)(3)(A)(II) (2015), full text at supra note 129.
205
See generally Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871 (2015), full text at supra note 129
(offering no definitions for the terms within the chapter).
206
See Who’s Got Them?, supra note 62 (providing that the NSA, FBI, and CIA all have access
to the devices).
207
H.R. 3871 (d)(3)(B) (2015).
208
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (explaining that getting a warrant
based on probable cause is a necessary prerequisite, the absence of which will create a per se
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to few narrow exceptions).
The Court further explains that electronic surveillance is not, by its very nature, one of the
exceptions to the rule. Id.
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could be granted upon probable cause after the evidence had already been
procured.209 Thus, in light of Katz, this portion of the statute, if enacted,
may be challenged as violative of the Constitution. 210
C. State-Level Legislation Is Filling in the Gaps
The main advantage of state-level legislation is that states are much
more productive than Congress.211 In fact, thirty-eight states enacted more
legislation than Congress did last year.212 Furthermore, while lawmakers
on Capitol Hill only saw four percent of bills turned into law, state
lawmakers saw twenty-five percent.213 Since Rigmaiden’s case shed light
on the previously undisclosed use of the Stingray, a flurry of states have
enacted privacy legislation to control police use of the Stingray. 214
All of these state laws address evidentiary concerns, but offer little to
no deterrence for police officers in violation. 215 The laws prevent
warrantless Stingray-acquired evidence from entering courtrooms. 216
However, states have also allowed exceptions that will allow evidence in
some circumstances.217 One issue with some of the earlier enacted statutes
See id. at 358 (explaining that allowing such evidence “bypasses the safeguards
provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far
less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be
subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment”).
210
Compare id. (providing precedent that electronic surveillance does not fall within the
warrant exception) with Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871 (d)(3)(B) (2015) (stating that
an exception to the warrant requirement can exist where “a warrant could be entered to
authorize such use.”).
211
See Glen Justice, States Six Times More Productive Than Congress, CQ ROLL CALL (Jan. 27,
2015),
http://cqrollcall.com/statetrackers/states-six-times-more-productive-thancongress/ [https://perma.cc/K6T6-5KMJ] (providing data that shows that even many
smaller populated states, such as West Virginia, North Dakota and Rhode Island, are much
quicker and more effective at enacting legislation than the United States Congress).
212
See id. (illustrating that the average bill passage rate for United States Congress is four
percent, whereas the national average for state legislatures is twenty-five percent). The study
also explains that part of the reason that states are more effective is because state-level
legislatures have issues that are sometimes more pressing, which can cost the state
congressmen their jobs if they do not pass resolutions to state and local issues. Id.
213
See id. (demonstrating that the state-level legislatures are much more likely to pass
proposed legislation than legislators on Capitol Hill).
214
See supra Part I (detailing the story of Daniel Rigmaiden).
215
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (demonstrating that all state laws to this point
have been evidence-focused). See, e.g., MONT. CODE § 46-5-110 (2015) (providing that police
officers need a warrant before tracking the location of a wireless device, subjecting a violator
to a fifty-dollar penalty for breaking the statute).
216
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (detailing that every state law currently in
place bars evidence from Stingray devices that has been obtained without a warrant, subject
to some exceptions).
217
See, e.g., TENN. CODE § 39-13-610(c) (2014) (allowing seven exceptions to the warrant
requirement). The exceptions to Tennessee’s Stingray law exceptions are as follows:
209
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is that they may have been enacted before the full abilities of the Stingray
were known to the state legislatures.218
Although these laws are a step in the right direction, they do not
completely remedy the holes in the federal law. 219 Take California’s
Stingray law, for example, which is considered to be one of the most
stringent.220 First, it covers situations where a law enforcement agency
wishes to gather electronic information from a service provider. 221 In
California, the policing agency must get a warrant, a wiretap order, or an
order for electronic reader records before making any service provider
hand over user information or access to a user’s device. 222 This provision
grants privacy rights beyond the constitutional protections under the
Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Smith v. Maryland.223
Another strength of California’s law is that it goes into very specific
warrant mandates relating to the use of Stingrays or other similar

Id.

(1) If the electronic device is reported stolen by the owner;
(2) If necessary to respond to the user's call for emergency services;
(3) To prevent imminent danger to the life of the owner or user;
(4) To prevent imminent danger to the public;
(5) With the informed, affirmative consent of the owner or user of the
electronic device;
(6) If the user has posted the user’s location within the last twenty-four
(24) hours on a social media web site; or
(7) If exigent circumstances justify obtaining location information for
the electronic device without a warrant.

See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining the various capabilities of the Stingray, including the
ability to intercept/block communications, the ability to gather device information, and the
ability to target location). See, e.g., VA. CODE § 19.2-56.2 (2014) (referring only to the
technology as “tracking devices,” but failing to address admissibility of information that is
intercepted or device information that is gathered by the device).
219
See supra Part II.C (analyzing constitutional and federal statutory law that pertains to
the Stingray).
220
See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 (2016) (providing strict warrant requirements
and allowing for judicial oversight of Stingray evidence). See also In Landmark Victory for
Digital Privacy, Gov. Brown Signs California Electronic Communications Privacy Act into Law,
ACLU (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-victory-digital-privacygov-brown-signs-california-electronic-communications-privacy [https://perma.cc/HLY22Y3M] (explaining the ACLU’s position that the enacted California Stingray legislation
should set a model for the rest of the nation).
221
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“a government entity shall not . . . [c]ompel the
production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than
the authorized possessor of the device.”)
222
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(b) (detailing the ways in which police can access the
electronic information).
223
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 (providing strict judicial oversight for user call log
information) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (allowing law enforcement to
install a pen register to record incoming and outgoing caller information because it falls
under the third-party doctrine).
218
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equipment.224 The law also gives the issuing judge the authority to
appoint a special master (a qualified attorney) to ensure that only the
information sought in the warrant is pursued by law enforcement, and
that any additional unrelated information be destroyed. 225
Washington passed a bill in 2015, which was the first of its kind to
mention “cell-site simulator device” directly.226 The law bans all use of
Stingray-acquired evidence unless the law enforcement agency has a
warrant based on probable cause, has the device user’s informed consent,
or “[acts] in accordance with a legally recognized exception to the warrant
requirements.”227 The allowance of exceptions may be one of the law’s
greatest strengths because it only allows exceptions that would otherwise
be recognized by the judge.228
Some other state laws speak exactly to what exceptions the legislature
has in mind.229 One of these exceptions could be generally classified as
the “emergency exception.”230 Although states define the exception
224
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(3) (2014) (“a government entity shall not . . . [a]ccess
electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication
with the electronic device.”).
225
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(e)(1)–(2) (2014) (granting the Court discretion over the
process by which the law enforcement gathers the evidence). The full text of this provision
states:
(e) When issuing any warrant or order for electronic information, or
upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or order, a
court may, at its discretion, do either or both of the following:
(1) Appoint a special master . . . charged with ensuring that only
information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or
order is produced or accessed.
(2) Require that any information obtained through the execution of
the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant
be destroyed as soon as feasible after the termination of the current
investigation and any related investigations or proceedings.
Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(e) (2016) (providing the procedure by which a police
officer can appoint a special master). The statute states that a special master is “a member in
good standing of the California State Bar and who has been selected from a list of qualified
attorneys that is maintained by the State Bar particularly for the purposes of conducting the
searches.” Id. § 1524(d)(1). The statute considers the special master to be a public employee.
Id. The court is to make an effort to ensure that the special master has no relationship to any
of the parties involved in the issuance of the search warrant. Id. Furthermore, any
information that is obtained using a special master is confidential and only subject to be
divulged by judicial inquiry. Id.
226
See H.B. No. 1440, Wash. Sixty-Fourth Leg., First Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (stating that
the purpose of the law is to prohibit the use of cell site simulators without a warrant).
227
See id. (providing the standard for all cell-site simulators by which law enforcement
officers must comply).
228
See id. (allowing judicially-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement).
229
See statutes cited supra note 133 (describing several exceptions to state Stingray laws).
230
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-33-5-12 (2016) (“[police must obtain a warrant]
unless . . . exigent circumstances exist that necessitate using the tracking instrument without
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differently, the notion is that if a police officer believes that a person’s life
is in danger, the officer can circumvent the typical warrant requirement.231
Another common exception is the good faith exception. 232 The good
faith exception is a constitutionally recognized exception to the
exclusionary rule.233 The problem with allowing a good faith exception to
apply to Stingray evidence is that it could potentially provide
disincentives to police from using a high-degree of due diligence with the
Stingray.234 Unlike a typical police warrant to search personal property,
the use of a Stingray can subject numerous citizens to a search at a single
time.235 With the highly-intrusive capabilities of the Stingray, there may
need to be added measures that ensure the police are not abusing the
Stingrays capabilities.236 On the other hand, United States v. Leon provides
a valuable rule, in that police officers that comply with substantially all of
the warrant requirements in good faith, but discover a procedural defect
after the fact, should not be punished. 237 However, the advantage of
creating a very narrow good faith exception for the Stingray is that the
police officers would be on notice that using the device is exceptional and
requires a very high degree of due diligence. 238
first obtaining a court order.); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (d) (2016) (“A government entity may
obtain location information without a tracking warrant . . . in an emergency situation that
involves the risk of death or serious physical harm to a person who possesses an electronic
communications device”); MONT. CODE § 46-5-110(1)(b)(iv) (2016) (“A government entity
may obtain location information of an electronic device [if] . . . there exists a life-threatening
situation”); UTAH CODE § 77-23c-102 (2014) (providing that a separate statute allows police
to gather cell location information in emergency situations).
231
See MONT. CODE § 46-5-110(1)(b)(iv) (2016) (allowing evidence to be admissible in life
or death situations or if a person is in risk of being harmed physically).
232
See Ball, supra note 93 (describing the good faith exception and its common applicability
to searches under the Fourth Amendment). See also Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 364
(Md. Spec. App. 2016) (explaining that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule will
generally exist in situations where no officer-error exists).
233
See id. at 365 (citing Supreme Court precedent regarding the exclusionary rule). See also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 890 (1984) (holding that the good faith exception is
applicable in situations where the police officer relied on a warrant even if the probable cause
upon which the warrant is granted is later found to be deficient as a matter of law).
234
See Andrews, 134 A.3d at 365 (refusing to allow the defendant to invoke the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule because the police had made warrant errors).
235
See Hernandez, supra note 54 (explaining that the Stingray can search through any
cellphone within its radius without the user having knowledge).
236
See supra Part II.A.2 (providing that the Stingray has the ability to intercept/block
communications, triangulate users’ location, and gather information from all cellphones
within range of the Stingray, all without the users or service provider having any knowledge
that the search has occurred).
237
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 890 (holding that the exclusionary rule is subject to the good faith
exception if the warrant has a minor defect).
238
See William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 463 (1981) (explaining the
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In conclusion, states have been enacting legislation in an effort to
protect the privacy rights of their citizens.239 Thus far, several states have
enacted statutes, and still others are in the beginning stages of proposal.240
However, some of these laws are currently too relaxed, and require added
protections to ensure public privacy.241
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Legislators, both state and federal, are starting to address the alarming
privacy concern associated with Stingray use. 242 Stingrays have the ability
to gather communication and location data from all devices in radius,
which potentially causes Fourth Amendment concerns.243 In crafting antisurveillance legislation or amending older laws, legislators should look at
the capabilities of the Stingray holistically, which is currently lacking in
some states.244
This Part will propose a three-pronged approach that legislators
should consider when they are in the process of enacting Stingray privacy
legislation.245 First, Part IV.A.1 provides that legislators should make
strict warrant requirements for police use of the Stingray. 246 Then, Part
IV.A.2 proposes that legislatures should provide a deterrent for misuse of
the Stingray, both for private citizens as well as law enforcement. 247
Finally, Part IV.A.3 argues that legislators should give discretionary

downfalls of the exclusionary rule, especially that it weakens the Fourth Amendment and
fails to deter police from carelessly committing police misconduct).
239
See statutes cited supra note 133 (providing the states that have enacted legislation thus
far). See also supra note 129 (providing the full text of the proposed Stingray Privacy Act of
2015).
240
See statues cited supra note 133 (illustrating that many states have already enacted
legislation to deal with the Stingray).
241
See, e.g., TENN. CODE § 39-13-610(c) (2014) (allowing several broadly defined exceptions
that allow the Stingray evidence to be admissible).
242
See statutes cited supra note 133 (providing all the states that have adopted legislation
for the Stingray).
243
See supra section II.A (explaining how Stingray technology creates privacy concerns for
the public as a whole because it potentially can access the information of not only the target,
but all of the persons within the Stingray’s radius).
244
See, e.g., VA. CODE § 19.2-56.2 (accessing only the capability of the Stingray to determine
the location information of a device).
245
See infra Part IV.A (proposing a three-pronged approach that legislators can use when
making standards applicable to Stingray technology).
246
See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining how strict warrant requirements, like those in
Washington, will help keep potentially invasive information out of the courtroom).
247
See infra Part IV.A.2 (arguing that some sort of criminal penalty should be imposed on
those who abuse the capabilities of the Stingray).
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powers to judges to use special procedures when issuing a warrant for the
Stingray to ensure that public privacy is not hindered. 248
A. Proposals
1.

Make Strict Warrant Requirements For Police Use Of The Stingray

Legislators should keep in mind that the Stingray has very powerful
capabilities and opens up real privacy concerns for the general public.249
For this reason, legislatures should enact a standard that does not allow
for broad exceptions.250 However, because the technology is new, it may
be best to grant more power to judges to adopt standards that are
consistent with typical exclusionary rules.251
Washington’s law provides a strong example of a state law that both
requires a warrant, and allows the judiciary to apply legally recognized
exclusions to the warrant requirement, except that it does not clearly state
that information exchanged between cellphone and cell site simulator is
not voluntary.252 As a result, model language for an anti-surveillance
clause on warrant requirements should follow Washington’s standard,
but with added language, which reads:
The state and its political subdivisions shall not, by means
of a cell site simulator device, collect or use a person’s
electronic data or metadata without:
(1) that person's informed consent,
(2) a warrant, based upon probable cause, that
describes with particularity the person, place, or
thing to be searched or seized, or
(3) acting in accordance with a legally recognized
exception to the warrant requirements, insofar as any
data transmitted to or from a cellular device to or from a

248
See infra Part IV.A.3 (promoting California’s legislation, which allows the judge to
appoint special masters and to quash any evidence not related to the investigation that may
be gathered by a Stingray).
249
See supra Part II.A (discussing the various capabilities of the Stingray).
250
See, e.g., Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (allowing many exceptions that police can use to circumvent the typical warrant
requirement).
251
See H.B. No. 1440, Wash. Sixty-Fourth Leg., First Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (delegating to
the judge the ability to determine whether Stingray-acquired evidence falls within typical
judicially-recognized standards).
252
See id. (giving discretionary power to the judge to make evidentiary findings, while still
mandating a warrant procedure).
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cell site simulator device shall not be considered
voluntarily rendered by the user to a third-party.253
This provision is appropriately flexible to fit within the confines of
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, but at the same time
informs law enforcement that the warrant procedure must be followed
notwithstanding any challenges with the third-party doctrine.254
2.

Create a Deterrent for Both Police Misuse and Private Citizen Use of
the Stingray

Currently, no state offers a criminal or civil penalty for violation of its
Stingray Law.255 However, as provided in the Stingray Protection Act of
2015, violation of the law will lead to punishment by fine or
imprisonment.256 Both private use of the Stingray, as well as unwarranted
police use, should be explicitly a criminal act.257
One benefit of writing in a criminal penalty is that it will strongly
deter privacy invasions.258 Thus, future legislation should follow the
federal standard, and model legislation should state, “[a]nyone who
knowingly uses a cell site simulator [not in accordance to the warrant
procedure] shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for not more than
10 years, or both.”259 In sum, the possibility of a penalty is needed and the
above provision works well as a deterrent.260

253
H.B. No. 1440 § 1, Wash. Sixty-Fourth Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (additional
italicized text added by author).
254
See id. (providing strict language for a warrant).
255
See statues cited supra note 133 (outlining all the states that currently have enacted
Stingray legislation). But see Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (b) (2015),
full text at supra note 129 (demonstrating that anyone in violation of the proposed law can
be fined or imprisoned up to ten years).
256
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (b) (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (creating a specific deterrence in the statute by imposing penalties to those in
violation).
257
See id. (criminalizing breaking the proposed federal statute). See also Pell & Soghoian,
supra note 63 (addressing the fact that the Stingray is no longer just in the hands of police,
and is now available to the public).
258
See Romboy, supra note 128 (explaining that the Stingray Privacy Act of 2015’s cosponsor Jason Chaffetz intended for the penalties to serve as a deterrent).
259
See Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. § (b) (2015), full text at supra
note 129 (creating a penalty for violators).
260
See id. (proposing a fine or imprisonment up to ten years for knowing violators of the
Act).
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Judicial Discretion for Special Masters and Evidence Destruction

California is the only state that has enacted legislation that allows
judges to have the discretionary ability to appoint a special master (courtappointed attorney) who will oversee the use of the Stingray. 261 This
procedure helps ensure citizens’ privacy by ensuring that the
requirements of the warrant that are judicially proscribed are actually
followed by the enforcing officers.262 Additionally, the oversight of a
special master adds credibility to law enforcement’s case if and when the
evidence procured needs to go to trial. 263
California also gives judges discretionary power to destroy evidence
not related to the warrant or investigation. 264 Given the fact that the
Stingray can acquire evidence from unintended third-party users, this
standard also helps ensure privacy of the public at large. 265 As such, a
judicial oversight model clause for a Stingray should mimic the language
of the California statute.266 In sum, the judicial oversight provision
appropriately allows for judges to oversee the warrant procedure to
ensure that the Stingray is not misused during the search and that all data
unrelated to the warrant is destroyed after the evidence has been
gathered.267
B. Commentary
Some have argued that data sent through the air has no reasonable
expectation of privacy because the cellphone user is sending the
261
See supra note 225 (providing the text of the statutory provision that gives judges
discretionary power to appoint a special master).
262
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (establishing that the purpose of the statute is to better
define current privacy interests and ensuring that electronic device information is private to
the extent that it requires a warrant based off of probable cause before a search may be
conducted).
263
See, e.g., In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(holding that the pen register warrant was declined in part because the agent seeking the
request did not have valid answers for exactly how the technology was going to be used in
the investigation).
264
See supra note 225 (providing the text of the statutory provision that gives judges
discretionary power to destroy evidence that is unrelated to the purpose of the warrant).
265
See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (ruling by magistrate judge
that the pen register warrant was denied due to concerns for other users’ data who could be
compromised as a result of the investigation).
266
See supra note 225 (providing the full relevant statutory text that is advocated by the
author).
267
See supra note 225 (giving judges the ability to enforce the issuance of a warrant to use
a Stingray).
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information voluntarily to a third party (the phone company). 268
Therefore, under the third-party doctrine, police have a right to ensure
public safety interests, which would otherwise be violations of individual
privacy interests.269 This argument concludes that, because cellphone data
falls within the third-party doctrine, it should not be subject to probable
cause and warrant requirements under the Fourth Amendment.270
However, this argument misses the point because society has evolved to
the point where the cellphone is oftentimes intrinsically connected to the
user, with highly-personal content which requires added legal
protection.271
Another argument is that promoting a standard that criminalizes
police misuse of the device is going too far. 272 The argument states that
the inability to use evidence gathered by the Stingray would be enough of
a deterrent for police officers.273 However, this argument fails to recognize
the Stingray’s invasive nature, in that if it is used carelessly, the Stingray
has the potential to expose intimate secrets of virtually limitless
unsuspecting users without any potential for recourse. 274
Finally, an argument could be made that the judicial power to issue a
warrant is the only power the judge should have in overseeing the
268
See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (discussing the argument in favor of the
third-party doctrine being applied to electronic data communications).
269
See supra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining that in the absence of the thirdparty doctrine, criminal actors would use the Fourth Amendment as a shield to otherwise
publicly-discoverable information).
270
See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text (providing the third-party doctrine
advocates arguments, which are often advanced by the government, that cellphone data does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because it is freely disseminated to thirdparties).
271
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (ruling that police cannot go
through the physical contents of their cellphone unless they have been issued a warrant).
Writing for the majority in Riley, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience.
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many
Americans the privacies of life, []. The fact that technology now allows
an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
fought.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
272
See Nelson, supra note 197 (questioning whether the Bill would go too far in acting as a
deterrent for police officers).
273
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(d) (2014) (providing no penalties for police officers who
use the Stingray without a warrant, except that the evidence will be thrown out).
274
See supra section II.A.2 (explaining the capabilities of the Stingray). See also In re the
Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and
Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (ruling by judge that the
concern of unintended user data to be compromised weighed against the issuance of a Pen
Register order).
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executive powers of the policing agency.275
Again, this is a
misunderstanding of the Stingray’s capabilities. 276 With the appointment
of a special master the judge can ensure that the device is only used for
the capability that is stated in the warrant, which is a real concern,
considering the Stingray’s capabilities.277 Additionally, the ability to
destroy other evidence grants the judge the authority to ensure that data
from private citizens is not inadvertently stored in a police database. 278
Thus, both of these judicial powers give a valid check on the police power
of the law enforcement agency.279
V. CONCLUSION
For years, the FBI kept the use of the Stingray out of the public eye.
Now, the Stingray’s use by both state and federal law enforcement
agencies is widely known. The Stingray is able to manipulate cell
networks by acting as a fake tower, and in the process it can gather
incoming and outgoing call information, intercept communications, and
track locations of unsuspecting parties. Unfortunately, the Stingray does
not fit well with any current federal privacy legislation. Indeed, neither
the Federal Pen Register Statute, nor the Wiretap Act contain statutory
language that directly encompasses all the abilities of the Stingray. To
remedy this problem, state legislators across the country have enacted
statutes. However, many states remain without legislation to guide the
courts and police on the use of the Stingray. To best address the abilities
of the Stingray, new legislation should include a threefold approach. First,
the legislation should include strict warrant requirements that are flexible
enough to conform to existing laws of evidence. Second, legislatures
should consider enacting legislation that deters warrantless use of the
Stingray, including both police and private citizens. Finally, legislators
should consider enacting statutes that give judicial oversight of warranted
use of the Stingray to best assure that public privacy is not undermined.
In conclusion, the technology of Stingrays is developing, and the state

See U.S. CONST. art. I (granting police powers to the executive branch of government).
See supra section II.A.2 (explaining Stingray’s abilities to intercept, locate devices, and
take user information).
277
Cf. supra note 225 (providing the statutory language that gives the judge the
discretionary ability to appoint a special master to oversee the use of the Stingray).
278
See Goldstein, supra note 179 (explaining how police in New York have created a
database of phone information by subpoenaing phone carriers for information).
279
See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text (detailing the arguments both for and
against judicial use of the special master and the ability to quash unrelated evidence that
turns up in a Stingray investigation).
275
276
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legislatures have the unique opportunity to shape the future of
information privacy in the United States.
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